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- Highwaymen in Ambush or Driving Force 




  The article first analyses the interplay between standard-setting and patents. 
Especially de iure product-standards have a major impact on the global economy 
and they can generate a number of very positive effects. On the other hand, the 
vulnerability of markets that depend on a standard can impose a great danger. 
Due to the network effect and other factors, the disadvantages of switching away 
from a standard to another can be so high that markets and market players adhere 
to a standard even if this entails severe disadvantages. This effect can give much 
power to a market player controlling the standard, for example by holding a 
patent that covers a technology which forms a part of the standard. All safety 
measures against abusive behavior of such patent holders require that the patent 
and its relevance to the standard are known in advance. A patent holder may, 
however, conceal a standard-relevant patent, wait until the standard is implemented, 
and then demand high royalties to the standard users. This scenario can be called 
a “patent ambush”. 
  The article then analyzes one of the most famous patent ambush-cases, the 
“Rambus” case, and shows how differently this case has been handled in the US 
and Europe respectively. Core problems in the handling of patent ambushes 
become evident in the Rambus case: relevant patents and their holders are not 
necessarily identifiable. The right to proscribe the use of a patented technology 
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and the right to grant a license only in return of a royalty payment are core 
elements of the protection a patent confers. To restrain those powers in patent 
ambush cases means interfering heavily with the patent law system and its 
coherence. The protection and the rewards an intellectual property confers are 
very important incentives that help to foster a dynamic and innovative economy 
capable of generating public welfare. Therefore, interfering with rights conferred 
by standard-relevant patents is potentially very dangerous. 
  Against this background the article discusses several possible solutions to the 
patent ambush-problem, i.e. contract law, patent law, and competition law. As this 
exercise shows, patent law may be the most appropriate area of law to deal with 
patent ambushes but it has not yet been developed an effective and widely 
accepted instrument. As a result, the application of competition law is, for the time 
being, still necessary to assure the prevention of harmful patent ambush practices.
Keywords: antitrust law, Art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), de facto-standard, de iure-standards, dominance, 
exclusionary conduct, FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non-discriminatory), 
JEDEC (Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council), lock-in, network 
effect, patent ambushes, patent law, patent thickits, patent trolls, 
patents, Rambus. royalty stacking, Sec. 2 Sherman Act, Sec. 5 FTC 
Act, standard, standard setting organization (SSO), standard-relevant patent, 
standards estoppel, standard-setting, third party intended beneficiaries
 
I. Introduction—Standard—Setting
The issue I want to talk about today relates to the interplay of standard-setting 
and patents. I assume we all have an idea of what “patents” are and how they are 
protected by patent laws. But let me say some introducing words about the 
standard-setting process.
A standard can be–for today’s purpose–be defined as an explicit set of 
requirements for an item, material, component, system or service.1) Although there 
are various types of standards,2) such as product standards, business method-standards 
1) Cf. DIN EN 45020:2006 – Normung und damit zusammenhängende Tätigkeiten –  
Allgemeine Begriffe (ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004).
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or safety standards, we understand our issue best by focussing on standards 
defining technologies that are used within a certain type of products. 
Standards can be further differentiated by looking at the entity that sets the 
standard. If standards are adopted by a private standard setting organization (SSO) 
or by a governmental body, we call them de iure-standards.3) Within private 
standard setting organizations, standards are usually set by specialized working 
groups that are comprised of representatives of important market players as well 
as independent experts. Standards may, however, also derive from a design that is 
implemented by a single undertaking or a group of undertakings; if this attempt is 
successful and gets the market to adopt the design, a “de facto” -standard has 
been put in place.4) 
Especially, de iure product-standards have a major impact on the global economy. 
Some figures shall evidence this: 84% of the products that are exported by 
German undertakings are based on standards; 1.5 billion USD per year are spent 
on standard setting activities; there exist some 500.000 de iure-standards worldwide; 
and, to give a last example, standard setting is said to contribute 1% to the gross 
national product of Germany.5)
Although standard setting is, as seen, of high practical relevance, it is — in a 
certain way — a paradoxical phenomenon: Competitors, usually trying to outpace 
one another by differentiating their products and trying to keep secret their 
respective technical solutions, come together to define a common frame that 
makes their products uniform to a certain extent, thereby sharing important 
2) American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Handbook on the Antitrust 
Aspects of Standards Setting, Chicago 2004, p.6 et seqq.; Ashton, Peter, Some 
Economic Effects of Standards – Comment, 19 Applied Economics 1515-1519 (1987), 
1515 et seqq.
3) Walther, Michael/Baumgartner, Ulrich, Standardisierungs – Kooperationen und Kartellrecht, 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2008, 158-167, 158 et seqq.
4) Spark, Kevi, Format War, Antitrust Casualties: The Sherman Act and the Blu-Ray – 
HD DVD Format War, 83 Southern California Law Review 173-228 (2009).
5) Cf. DIN, Deutsches Institut für Normun (Hrsg.), Gesamtwirtschaftlicher Nutzen der 
Normung: Wissenschaftlicher Endbericht – Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse, Berlin, 
Wien, Zürich 2000, p.5.
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business data. Moreover, legislation and antitrust agencies are willing to accept, in 
principle, the direct collaboration of competitors as long as they join forces to set 
up a standard — although this collaboration could easily be interpreted as an 
anticompetitive cartel. The reason why competitors and antitrust agencies accept 
and even foster standard setting is because standard setting generates a number of 
positive economic effects.6) For producers, standards reduce transaction and production 
costs and they facilitate the development of auxiliary equipment and other 
complementary products; standards also facilitate the entry of new players in the 
market because they make sure that their products, as long as they comply with 
the standard, meet basic product requirements in that market. As for consumers, 
standards can help them to compare different products based upon the same 
standard; and standards guarantee that complying products are safe and convenient. 
As for national economies, the standard setting process helps to identify superior 
solutions and to establish them within the market. In particular, de iure-standards 
avoid economically inefficient “standards wars”7) between market players and their 
respective solutions (we have recently experienced such a standards war in the 
DVD-sector between the Blue Ray and the HD-DVD technology)8). 
These advantages of standard setting do, however, have their downsides: One 
grave danger — and the one this paper is mainly dealing with — is the vulnerability 
of markets that depend on a standard. Once the standard is implemented and the 
market has tipped towards it, the market and its players might not easily give up 
the standard or switch to a different standard. This can especially be due to the 
so called network effect:9) The more producers and consumers use the standard, 
the more value generated by the standard to each respective user — this is because 
the common technological basis facilitates the interaction (in the broadest sense) 
6) For an overview, see Blind, Knut, The Economics of Standards, Cheltenham 2004, 
p.14 f.
7) Grindley, Peter, Standards, Strategy and Policy: Cases and Stories, 3. Aufl., Oxford 1995, 
p.74 et seqq. 
8) Hill, Charles/Jones, Gareth, Strategic Management Theory: An Integrated Approach, Cincinnati 
2009, p.240 et seqq. 
 9) For more details on network effects, see Evans, David/Schmalensee, Richard, A Guide 
to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 Antitrust 36-40 (1996), 36 et seq.
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between the users. Due to the network effect and other factors, the disadvantages 
of switching away from a standard can be so high that markets and market 
players adhere to a standard even if this entails severe disadvantages. This effect 
can give much power to a market player controlling the standard. Such control 
can, as we will see now, be conferred for example by a patent that covers a 
technology that forms a part of the standard. 
II. Patent Ambushes and Their Difficult Legal Handling
1. The Patent Ambush-phenomenon
A patent on a standard or a part of the standard can confer on the patent holder 
a dangerous power. As the patent gives him the right to prevent others from using 
his patented technology10) and, in consequence, to use the standard, the patent 
holder can either block the standard altogether or extort high license fees from 
standard users. Standard setting organizations and their members may be able to 
prevent this outcome by simply not integrating the protected technology into the 
standard. They may also at least minimize the negative consequences by obliging 
the patent holder to grant licenses on conditions specified before the standard is 
set. All these safety measures require, however, that the patent and its relevance 
to the standard are known in advance. A patent holder who wants to exploit a 
controlling position over a standard therefore has an interest to keep the patent 
secret until the standard is implemented. Wrapping up these considerations, we 
can identify a paradigmatic scenario: A patent holder conceals a standard-relevant 
patent, waits until the standard is implemented, and then demands high royalties 
to the standard users. For the rest of this presentation, we want to focus on this 
scenario and call it a “patent ambush”.11)
10) Benkard/Scharen, Patentgesetz/Gebrauchsmustergesetz, 10. Aufl., München 2006, § 9 
PatG n. 4 w.f.r.
11) Cf. For this terminology e.g. Hillel, Jonathan, Standards x Patents / Antitrust = : The 
Inadequacy of Antitrust to Address Patent Ambush, 17 Duke Law & Technology 
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2. The Rambus Case and its Outcome
The patent ambush is far from being only an academic problem. In one of the 
most famous patent ambush-cases, Rambus Inc., a developer and licensor of 
computer memory technologies,12) took part in the setting of a standard for 
computer memory technology (DRAM). This standard setting was run by the 
business-wide standard-setting organization JEDEC (Joint Electronic Device 
Engineering Council).13) As Rambus realised that it held patents on some 
technologies that were to become part of the standard it concealed those patents 
and even filed new patents that covered other parts of the standard. After the 
standard had been set and implemented, Rambus demanded royalty rates from the 
standard users that were roughly thrice as high as the royalty rates negotiated 
before the standard had been set.14)
Looking at the patent ambush-situation and the Rambus-case, one may at first 
sight think: Where is the problem? If a patent holder’s conduct is abusive, just 
bar it from imposing its patents and everything will be solved. Things are, 
however, not that easy. This can already be seen from the outcome of the 
Rambus-case both in Europe and the US: In the US, the FTC opened proceedings 
against Rambus and ordered the undertaking to grant any interested party a 
worldwide, nonexclusive license for its patents on a royalty basis that lay 
significantly below the royalty level demanded by Rambus.15) The FTC did 
however not declare the patents unenforceable or order a royalty-free license. Yet, 
the US Court of Appeals was not even convinced by this limited intervention and 
set aside the FTC’s orders (we will examine the reasons afterwards).16) The 
Supreme Court of the US did not take the appeal against this decision17) and the 
Review 1-56 (2010).
12) For further information on this company, see http://www.Rambus.com.
13) JEDEC has now changed its full name into “Solid State Technology Association”, cf. 
http://www.jedec.org/about-jedec/jedec-history.
14) FTC, Rambus 2006, 37 et seqq.
15) FTC, Rambus 2006; Final Order of the Federal Trade Commission of 02/02/2007, In 
the Matter of Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302.
16) Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 f. 3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
17) FTC v. Rambus Inc, 129 U.S. 1318 (2009).
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agency then closed the case. In Europe, things turned out less favourably for 
Rambus. After the EU Commission had opened up proceedings against the 
company, Rambus acceded to a so called consent order which obliged the 
undertaking to grant a license for its patents that is in part royalty-free. 
3. Core Problems in the Handling of Patent Ambushes
One may discern three core reasons why the legal handling of patent 
ambush-cases appears to be so problematic. First, it is difficult to prevent patent 
ambushes or to block them at an early stage — relevant patents and their holders 
are not necessarily identifiable when the standard is set; the holder of a relevant 
patent may not even take part in the standard setting process. 
Second, the patents used for ambushes usually are obtained in a flawless manner 
and are not subject to any legal misgivings. Furthermore, the right to proscribe 
the use of a patented technology and the right to grant a license only in return of 
a royalty payment are core elements of the protection a patent confers. To restrain 
those powers in patent ambush cases means interfering heavily with the patent law 
system and its coherence. 
And third, the question of where to draw the limits between patent rights and 
patent protection has never been a purely legal one but also an economic and 
social one. The protection and the rewards an intellectual property confers are 
very important incentives that help to foster a dynamic and innovative economy 
capable of generating public welfare.18) Market players are ready to invest in 
research and development and to share — via the publication of patents — their 
inventions with others because they know that these inventions are — for a certain 
period of time — protected against free copying and because they can expect to 
draw profits from the licensing or from the exclusive usage of their inventions. 
This “incentive-mechanism” is the very bedrock of any patent law system.19) 
Interfering with rights conferred by standard-relevant patents is revealed to be 
18) Kraβer, Rudolf, Patentrecht, 6. Aufl., München 200, § 3 IV w.f.r.
19) See for this, with a particular focus on the TRIPS-agreement, Dreier, Thomas TRIPS 
und die Durchsetzung von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums, GRUR Int. 1996, 205-218.
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potentially very dangerous — technologies that are to be standardized tend to be 
advantageous and valuable technologies. If a market player invented such a 
technology and did not from the first block its integration into the standard, 
should we punish him by limiting his patent rights? Aren’t we, by doing so, 
calling patent law’s incentive system into question?
III. Possible Solutions
This having been said, we might understand why the patent ambush-problem is 
currently intensely discussed on both sides of the Atlantic — and I am eager to 
learn about the Korean state of discussion. Things are very much in flux and no 
legal handling can be said to have been definitively established. But I would still 




In the US, as already mentioned, mainly the courts, flanked by some scholars,20) 
are rather reluctant to intervene in patent ambush cases. They mainly state that it 
is for the SSOs to define, whether and under which conditions standard-relevant 
patents should be disclosed. This is because only SSOs know how much disclosure 
is necessary to protect standard users and consumers and how little disclosure is 
recommendable to keep the participation in standard setting attractive to patent 
holders. Consequently, if SSOs do not have a patent disclosure policy or if this 
policy does not provide for clear disclosure obligations, no disclosure of relevant 
patents should be held to be mandatory.21) 
20) Stadheim, Theresa, Rambus, N-Data, and the FTC: Creating Efficient Incentives in 
Patent Holders and Optimizing Consumer Welfare in Standards-Setting Organizations, 
19 Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 483-517 (2009) 493 et seqq. (2009). 
21) Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 f. 3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 18; Mintzer, Erica/Breed, 
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Furthermore, successful patent ambushes and the power of patent holders 
resulting from them are — from this point of view — not really something to be 
concerned about. As the resulting market position of the patent holder is very 
attractive, it will spur competitors to come up with alternative technologies and 
standards.22) Sooner or later, competitors will successfully challenge the hitherto 
dominating patent holder and destroy its position of power. The patent ambush 
will have led to more intense competition and the market power it conferred will 
have destroyed itself.23)
b) Intervention Proponents
The majority of US scholars do, on the contrary, advocate a legal intervention 
in patent ambush cases.24) The legal instruments which are proposed for such an 
intervention are, however, numerous.
Some authors rely heavily on contract law.25) They regard the written policies 
of standard setting organizations, which contain — amongst other issues — rules of 
conduct for the participants of standard setting procedures, similar to contracts 
between the SSO and the standard setting-participants.26) Therefore, if the SSO 
policy constitutes an obligation to disclose relevant patents and/or to grant licenses 
on a royalty free- or FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non-discriminatory) basis, the 
Logan, How to Keep the Fox Out of the Henhouse: Monopolization in the Context 
of Standard-Setting Organizations, 19 Intellectual Property and Technology Law 
Journal 5-11 (2007), 11.
22) J. Hillel, 17 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 1 (2010).
23) Obviously this reasoning is deeply influenced by the Chicago School-paradigma of 
self-destroying monopolies; see Hovenkamp, Herbert, Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 
84 Michigan Law Review 213-284 (1985), 226 et seqq. (1985).
24) Hovenkamp, Herbert, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Alabama 
Law Review 103-131 (2008), 10; Tsilas, Nicos, Toward Greater Clarity and Consistency 
in Patent Disclosure Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Technology 475-531 (2004), 494 et seqq. (2004); Cotterr, Thomas, Patent Holdup, 
Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 Journal of Corporation Law 1151-1207 
(2009), 1188 et seqq. (2009), all w.f.r.
25) M. Lemley, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1909 et seq. (2002); Th. Cotterr, 34 J. Corp. L. 
1151, 1198 et seq. (2009).
26) M. Lemley, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1910, 1914 (2002).
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SSO would — as a contracting party — be in the position to claim and impose this 
conduct vis-à-vis a patent holding participant. Other participants of the standard 
setting-process are, according to this theory, not themselves parties of the contract. 
Yet, they are the so-called “third party intended beneficiaries” who are also 
entitled to invoke the contractual obligations.27)
Proposals that want to make patent law itself effective against patent ambushes 
mainly rely on the “Estoppel”-instrument.28) In its traditional form, an estoppel, 
the so-called equitable estoppel, bars the holder of a right from exerting that right 
if (1) the rightholder made a misleading representation concerning that right 
vis-à-vis a party that is in direct contact with the rightholder; if (2) the other 
party relied on that misrepresentation; and if (3) the other party would be 
materially harmed by the exertion of the right in question.29) 
To make the Estoppel instrument effective in standard-related patent ambush-cases, 
the two leading proponents of an Estoppel approach, US-Professors Merges and 
Kuhn, propose modifying the traditional equitable estoppel into a standards 
estoppel.30) They hold this modification to be necessary mainly with regard to two 
patent ambush aspects that the traditional equitable estoppel can hardly cover: 
First, the equitable estoppel requires a “misrepresentation” that is an act of 
communication, albeit by not answering to a relevant question. But in the 
circumstances where the holder of a relevant patent does not himself take part in 
the decisive periods of the standard setting process, no such act of communication 
may occur. And second, the required “direct contact” between the patent holder 
and the standard will probably not be established when the standard user did not 
take part in the standard setting process but only used the standard after its 
adoption by the SSO. Merges’ and Kuhn’s “standards estoppel” would not require 
an explicit misrepresentation or a direct contact between a patent holder and a 
standard user, thereby covering the aforementioned situations.
27) M. Lemley, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1915 (2002).
28) M. Lemley, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1918 (2002); Merges, Robert/Kuhn, Jeffrey, An 
Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 California Law Review 1-50 (2009), 1.
29) See e.g. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon, 326 f. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 2004), 733 w.f.r.
30) See for the following, R. Merges/J. Kuhn, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2009).
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The antitrust approach, followed mainly by the FTC and a large part of the 
doctrine,31) seems to become the most important stance in patent ambush cases. In 
Rambus, the FTC constructed this approach by the combined application of two 
core prescriptions of US antitrust law —Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act and Sec. 5 of 
the FTC Act. 
The exclusionary conduct, which is the core requirement to establish a violation 
of US antitrust law, is seen to be lying in the deceptive concealment of a 
standard-relevant patent.32) Concealing the patent is not competition on the merits 
and is therefore abusive, because it aims to get the patented technology integrated 
into the standard not because of its technological superiority but because of the 
erroneous belief that the technology was patent-free. 
The monopoly power which constitutes the next requirement of Sec. 2 of the 
Sherman Act/Sec. 5 of the FTC Act is in patent ambush cases conferred by the 
implementation of the standard.33) Once the market is locked into the standard due 
to the market-wide application of the standard, a market player who controls the 
standard eventually controls the market and can impose supracompetitive prices by 
exerting its monopoly power. 
The necessary link of causation between the exclusionary conduct and the 
monopoly power is established by the influence the deceptive conduct has on the 
participants of the standard setting procedure:34) Because the patent holder conceals 
his relevant patent, the technology becomes attractive to the standardization committee 
because no IP-rights seem to exist on it. And because the SSO chooses the 
technology for the standard, adopts the standard, and thereby makes the market 
implement the standard, the lock-in occurs which enables the patent holder to 
wield monopoly power. 
31) Th. Cotter, 34 J. Corp. L. 1151 (2009); Areeda, Phillip/Hovenkamp, Herbert, Antitrust 
Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 3rd Ed., New York 
2008, § 712d, all w.f.r.
32) P. Areeda/H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 2008, § 712d; Lemley, Mark, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Standard Setting-Organizations, 90 California Law Review 
1889-1973 (2002), 1931.
33) M. Lemley, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1930 (2002).
34) Th. Cotter, 34 J. Corp. L. 1151, 1196 et seqq. (2009) w.f.r
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2. EU
a) General Overview
We now turn to the EU perspective. To begin with, it can be said that scholarly 
literature, antitrust agencies, and the courts within the EU look at patent ambushes 
more critically than the US-jurisdiction does. This may be partly due to the 
fundamental fact that European legislators generally tend to be more sceptical as 
to whether markets and powerful market players generate benefits to the society if 
they remain free, to a large extent, from governmental and legal control. 
But there are also more specific reasons why intervention against patent ambushes 
is favoured in Europe. Let’s look back at the two main grounds on which US 
courts deny such intervention: First, it is said that SSOs can best and should 
decide whether and how relevant patents have to be disclosed. But evaluations of 
existing SSO-policies show that they deal with this task rather poorly —many 
SSO-policies do not address IP disclosure at all, and those who do are often very 
imprecise on that point.35) And this situation might not only be due to a lack of 
awareness of patent ambush-risks but also due to the very nature of standard 
setting organizations. These organizations are highly dependent on the undertakings 
that finance the SSOs, man their working groups and implement their standards. 
But at the same time those powerful market players often own big patent 
portfolios —would they really accept and support a standard setting organization 
whose rules oblige them to inform about the content of their portfolios or limit 
their freedom to set royalty rates at the level they prefer?36) Second, reference is 
made — in a typical “Chicago School”-reasoning — to the self-destruction of 
monopolies by the competition they attract. In the very long run this may be true 
35) He, Huaiwen, A self-defeating framework: how far could ITU patent policy go?, 
31 European Intellectual Property Review 343-346 (2009), 344 et seqq., with a considerable 
amount of empirical data. 
36) Drexl, Josef/Früh, Alfred/Mackenrodt, Mark-Oliver/Picht, Peter/Pulyer, Boris/Ullrich, 
Hanns, Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition 
and Tax Law on the Draft Commission Block Exemption Regulation on Research and 
Development Agreements and the Draft Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2010, 948-965, 
960, 963;H. He, 31 E.I.P.R. 343, 344 et seqq.(2009).
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even for monopolies that are based on the control over a standard. Standards-based 
monopolies are however especially hard to challenge because of the inertia of 
markets that are locked into standards and depend on the network effects that 
those standards created. Under these conditions, to make a whole market switch 
simultaneously towards another technology or standard, can take considerable time 
and effort that the period, in which the holder of the standard-relevant patent 
enjoys monopoly power, risks to severely harm market players and the public 
wealth.
This generally critical perception unfolds mainly two legal approaches, the 
patent law approach and the competition law approach. 
b) Patent Law
Proponents of the patent law approach either want to limit the scope of patents 
where they come into conflict with standards;37) or they want to impose on the 
patent holder a duty to license on a royalty free- or FRAND-basis.38) 
We don’t have the time to analyse these different propositions in detail. Yet, 
what can and must be said is that at least some of them seem to be promising —
but none of them seems operative at the moment or in the near future. To a large 
part this is due to the structure of the European patent law landscape — as patent 
law is not (yet) harmonized within the European Union, every member state grants 
its own national patents, has its own national patent law, and asserts it through its 
own national courts. As long as neither the national laws of the member states 
nor the European law establish specific patent law-rules,39) it cannot be said that 
patent law provides effective instruments against patent ambushes.
37) Ullrich, Hanns, Patente und technische Normen: Konflikt und Komplementarität in 
patent- und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, in: Leistner, Matthias (Hrsg.), Europäische 
Perspektiven des Geistigen Eigentums, Tübingen 2010, S. 14-95, 14, 85 et seqq.
38) See in particular, Koelman, Kamiel, An exceptio standardis: do we need an IP 
exemption for standards?, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 2006, 823-843, 823.
39) But see also C. Osterrieth, Patentrecht, München 2010, n. 83 et seqq. on the project 
of a “European Patent”.
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c) Competition Law
In comparison with the practical problems that limit the effectiveness of patent 
law instruments, the European antitrust law appears to be more operational. Art. 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in particular 
prohibits unilateral acts of dominant undertakings that distort competition in the 
Common market. This provision applies Union-wide and is enforced by central 
institutions, namely the European Courts and the European Commission. Not least 
this “operability” places the European Competition Law in the centre of the fight 
against patent ambushes. This is however, as we will now see, not to mean that 
Competition Law Rules can be applied to patent ambush cases without any 
difficulties.
Let us, at first, have a look at the core requirements of Art. 102 TFEU. To 
constitute a violation of this provision, it is necessary that (1) the respective 
undertaking has a dominant position within the internal market or within a 
substantial part of it, that (2) the dominant undertaking abuses his position, and 
that (3) this abuse may affect trade between Member States.40) 
From this analysis ensues the question of whether a market player that engages 
in a patent ambush fulfils these requirements: A “dominant position” has been 
defined as a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on a relevant market, 
by affording the undertaking the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers, and ultimately of consumers.41) A 
company holding a standard-relevant patent can, as we have heard, control a 
market that is locked into the standard. Consequently, it can price its licenses at a 
supracompetitive level. At first glance, the requirement of a dominant position is 
therefore easily fulfilled. Yet, according to the traditional interpretation of Art. 102 
TFEU, the dominant position needs to exist at the moment when the abusive 
40) For an overview, see Schulze/Zuleeg/Kadelbach, Europarecht, 2. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2010, § 16 w.f.r.
41) EuGH, Rs. 27/76 United Brands/Kommission, Slg. 1978, 207, n. 65; Rs. 85/76 
Hoffmann-La Roche/Kommission, Slg. 1979, 461, n. 38.
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conduct takes place. In patent ambush cases, however, the deception on the 
existence of a relevant patent takes place before the standard is even adopted. Can 
we nevertheless say that, in patent ambush cases, the possibly abusive conduct is 
shown by a dominant market player? Several solutions have been proposed to solve 
this problem; the most sweeping one would be to skip the Dominance-requirement 
altogether; this would, however, only be possible on a de lege ferenda basis; for 
now, it seems to be the most practical way to focus on the behaviour of the 
patent holder after the implementation of the standard42) –demanding supracompetitive 
royalties via making use of the market power he has already achieved. Even 
though this behaviour may in part be judged as anticompetitive just because of the 
patent holder’s conduct before the adoption of the standard, there is nevertheless 
an element of the entire behaviour that takes place after the implementation of the 
standard. This “second element” of behaviour should be enough to satisfy the 
traditional interpretation of the “dominant position”-requirement. 
With regards to the abuse-requirement, there are two main aspects that can 
make a patent ambush abusive in the sense of Art. 102 TFEU. First, it is abusive 
to foreclose competition in an anticompetitive way which ultimately harms the 
consumer. A technology that, due to a patent ambush, seems to be IP-free can 
appear to be superior to a patented technology because using the unpatented 
technology for the standard will not lead to royalty obligations and will not confer 
a position of control on a patent holder. The seemingly IP-free technology may 
therefore be chosen for the standard and may foreclose competing technologies 
which, after the implementation of the standard, do have little chance to succeed 
on the market.43) This outcome is however not due to the merits of the victorious 
technology; it is due to the deceptive conduct of its owner. As deceptive conduct 
is not competition on the merits, it constitutes — together with the following imposition 
of supra-competitive royalties — an abuse in the sense of Art. 102 TFEU. 
42) Cf. H. Ullrich, in: M. Leistner (Hrsg.), Europäische Perspektiven des Geistigen 
Eigentums, 2010, S. 14, 48 et seqq. w.f.r.
43) With this tendency Ullrich, Hanns, Patente, Wettbewerb und technische Normen: 
Rechts- und ordnungspolitische Fragestellungen, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
2007, 817-830, 827.
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Furthermore, it is abusive to demand excessive prices that could not have been 
demanded under effective competition. This form of abuse may at least be present 
if the royalty rates demanded by the patent holder are very high.44) 
An affection of the trade between Member States, that is an influence on the 
Common, not only on a national market,45) will usually be realised by the capture 
of a standard by a patent ambusher. As standards typically aim at the harmonization 
of a whole national, European or even worldwide market, they influence — if they 
are successful — the way business is run in the affected markets. And so do the 
conditions — e.g. royalty payments to a patent holder — on which the standards 
can be used.
As for the sanctions-side, it is highly controversial whether the patent holder 
should be obliged to grant a royalty-free license or a license that includes royalty- 
payments on a FRAND basis.46) As the sanctioning of one patent ambush-abuse 
should also aim at preventing further patent ambushes, it may be best not to grant 
FRAND-royalties for the patent holder. This is because otherwise patent holders 
could engage in patent ambushing without running high risks — even if they had 
to face an intervention of competition agencies or courts, they could nevertheless 
hope to reap considerable profits from the FRAND-licenses. 
IV. Summary and Perspective 
Although patent ambushes are, for sure, an important problem and although it 
seemspositive that EU-antitrust law might be made fit to come up with a solution, 
44) Ohly, Ansgar, „Patenttrolle“ oder: Der patentrechtliche Unterlassungsanspruch unter 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalt? Aktuelle Entwicklungen im US-Patentrecht und ihre 
Bedeutung für das deutsche und europäische Patentsystem, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 2008, 787–798, 794; Grabitz/Hilf, EUV/EGV, München 
2010, Art. 82 EGV n. 293.
45) Calliess/Ruffert/Weiβ, EUV/EGV, München 2007, Art. 82 EGV n. 69 et seqq.
46) J. Drexl/A. Früh/M.-O. Mackenrodt/P. Picht/B. Pulyer/H. Ullrich, IIC 2010, 948, 965; 
A. Ohly, GRUR Int 2008, 787, 794. 
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the ambushes are just one part of an overarching issue: How and where to limit 
patent protection in order to avoid a perversion of patents into instruments hindering 
economic growth and innovation. Patents on business methods, patent thickets, 
royalty stacking, and patent trolls — all these phenomena relate back to the same 
problem. Maybe we can draw from the examination of patent ambushes and from 
the discussion of the approaches earlier said the results that help us to face the 
overarching issue of the appropriate limitations of patent protection. 
I finish my presentation at this point. Thank you for your patience and I am 
eager to hear about the Korean perception of the problem. 
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